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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
- vs -
RICHARD EARL LANCASTER, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
10787 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a verdict of guilty by a 
Jury and a sentence to one year in the county jail 
on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with involuntary 
manslaughter in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, convicted by a jury, and 
sentenced by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, 
Judge, to one year in the county jail as provided by 
law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the jury verdict and 
2 
the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 8, 1965, Bobby Davis, the five-
year-old stepson of appellant was rushed to the L.D. 
S. Cottonwood Hospital where, after efforts to revive 
him failed, he was pronounced dead. The cause of 
death was determined to be aspiration of vomitus in 
the lungs resulting in asphyxiation (R.80). 
Prior to his death the deceased had been locked 
in the bathroom all day as the result of disciplinary 
action (R.96). He was thereafter told to bathe before 
dinner. Apparently appellant decided that the child 
was holding his breath while in the bathtub as he 
had done before and determined to give the child 
a whipping to stop him from holding his breath 
(R.97). Ferris Andrus, Captain in the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office, testified that appellant ad-
mitted hitting the child and that he didn't recall how 
many times he hit him (R.97). 
Dr. Horne, the physician on duty at the Cotton-
wood Hospital when the child was brought in, test-
ified that the deceased had extensive bruises on his 
head, neck, thorax, buttocks, and extremitites. The 
scrotum was bruised and small amounts of blood 
appeared on the buttocks (R. 63-65). 
Dr. Shelley Swift, pathologist whose qualifica-
tions were stipulated, performed an autopsy on the 
deceased the next day. He found numerous bruises 
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and superficial abrasions on the body confined 
chiefly to the right side of the face, the right side of 
the forehead and the right ear. Extensive brusises 
and abrasions were found on the buttocks and the 
backs of the legs. The scrotum and base of the penis 
were also bruised (R. 79). 
In response to the question, "Do you have an 
opinion based on reasonable medical certainty as 
to the connection between the external trauma in 
this case and the vomitus in the bronchial tubes?" 
Dr. Swift testified as follows: 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Doctor, what is that opinion? 
A. Well, it's not uncommon to find association between 
injury and vomitus, particularly in certain parts of 
the body. This is seen very commonly in children 
that they will vomit following injury of many types. 
Now, this is not only predicated by trauma, but, also, 
influenced by emotional disturbance and so on assoc-
iated with the trauma. Now, obviously I can't point 
my finger to any finding in the autopsy showing con-
nection between the two. This is merely an opinion. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. That there's a connection. A healthy, normal, child 
does not vomit and aspirate. 
Q. Then correct me if I'm wrong in stating your opinion, 
Doctor: Is it your opinion that there is a connection 
between the external trauma that you observed and 
the aspiration? 
(Objections by defendant and argument by prose-
cutor. Objections overruled.) 
A. The Witness: I believe there's a connection. 
Q. (By Mr. Lewis) Doctor, do you have an opinion as 
to whether or not the cause of death relates to the 
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external trauma? 
(Objection by defendant overruled.) 
A. The Witness: I believe that the death is due indirect-
ly to the external trauma, not directly. 
Q. Would you explain what you mean by "indirectly"? 
A. If the cause of death, of course, is due to the aspir-
ation of the vomitus, which I feel is indirectly con-
nected with the external trauma, that the actual 
trauma itself is not sufficient to cause death (R.82-
84). 
Doctor Swift further testified that all the factors 
of the trauma would not incapacitate a normal child 
(R.85); that aspiration of vomitus may be caused by 
any emotional upset (R.86-87); that death would 
probably not result from that amount of trauma 
alone; and that if the child hadn't aspirated the vom-
itus, death would probably not have resulted from 
the trauma (R.87). 
Doctor Swift attributed the cause of death to 
the fact that a child crying must exhaust itself of air. 
In the instant case the child had to breath before it 
had completely expelled the vomitus. (R.88). 
On cross examination, Dr. Swift testified that he 
could not state with medical certainty what caused 
the regurgitation (R.92). On redirect he stated that 
it was his opinion that the cause of death resulted 
from aspiration of vomitus brought about by the tra-
uma of the body (R.93). 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO GO 
TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IN ORDER TO FIND 
THE DEFENDENT GUILTY OF INVOLUNTARY MAN-
SLAUGHTER, THEY MUST FIND THAT DEATH WAS 
THE FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCE OF DEFEND-
ANT'S ACTS. 
While these two points of argument are tech-
nically separate, the facts and applicable law lend 
themselves to combining both points in one discus-
sion. 
Respondent submits that the evidence was suf-
ficient to allow the jury to find that appellant caused 
the death of deceased while committing an unlawful 
act not amounting to a felony. It is further submitted 
that the issue of foreseeability is immaterial to a 
charge of involuntary manslaughter where death 
occurs as the result of a commission of an unlawful 
act which was made illegal for the purpose of pro-
tecting the safety and security of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-5 (2) (1953 defines in-
voluntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice: 
" ... in the commission of an unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a 
lawful act which might produce death in an unlaw-
6 
ful manner or without due caution and circumspec-
tion." 
In instruction No. 6 requested by appellant, the 
trial court gave the above statute in defining "in-
voluntary manslaughter." 
In instruction No. 10, the jury was told: 
". . . a parent or a person in loco parentis, or in 
place of a parent, does not commit the crime of as-
sault or battery in chastising a child, if such chast-
isement is conducted with due care and circumspec-
tion." 
In instruction No. 12, the jury was told: 
" ... When there is a question of whether or not a 
person conducted himself without due caution ancl 
circumspection, the jury must answer the question 
in the light of all the surrounding circumstances for 
the term "due caution and circumspection" is a 
relative term and the amount of caution required 
under the law varies in accordance with the nature 
of the acts done, the type of instrumentality, if any, 
being handled or used, the surrounding circumstanc-
es, and the danger that could be apprehended. 
Instruction No. 10 submitted to the jury the 
question of whether appellant exceeded the limits 
of parental authority to chastise a child. On finding 
that appellant did exceed such limits the jury could 
thereupon find that appellant had committed the 
crimes of assault and battery. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-7-1, -1, -3 (1953) defining the crimes of assault 
and battery and Utah Code Ann. §~ 76-7-2, -4 (1953) 
making the crimes of assult and battery misde-
meanors. Certainly the evidence supports this find-
7 
ing by the jury. 
In State v. Straight, 136 Mont. 255, 347 P.2d 482 
(1959), the defendant had been caring for the child-
ren of his cousin and had permission to spank the 
children. The defendant had given the 29 month old 
baby of his cousin a "spanking" with a belt. The 
evidence presented to the jury showed that the 
child's body was bruised black and blue. The exam-
ining physician testified that he found brusises two 
inches long and one inch wide on the child's chest 
and lower abdomen; that his buttocks and legs were 
bruised, his penis scratched and swollen, and his 
scrotum scratched. In affirming the conviction the 
Court held that it was not unlawful for a parent or 
authorized person to use force or violence in a reas-
onable manner and moderate in degree but that it 
was up to the jury to determine from the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case whether the 
manner is reasonable and moderate, and if the jury 
determines that such is not the case, then the jury 
may go on to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to establish the assault. 
In State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 
(1965) the court held that corporal punishment of a 
child by his parent is permissible, but the use of im-
moderate or excessive physical violence against a 
child by a parent for correction or discipline pur-
poses is an aggravated assault and battery. 
In State v. Cobo. 90 Utah 89 at 97, 60 P.2d 952 
at 956 ( 1939) this Court in reversing a conviction for 
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voluntary manslaughter said: 
We believe the great weight of authority is that an 
unintentional killing, resulting from an unlawful 
assault and battery which in and of itself is not of 
a character to cause death, is held to constitute in-
voluntary manslaughter under statutes such as ours. 
See 29 C. J. 1150, § 137, and cases cited. 
It is quite clear from all the evidence that the death 
... resulted from an unlawful assault and battery, 
not of a character of itself likely to cause death, 
and that death unintentionally resulted. The evi-
dence as disclosed by the record would not warrant 
finding that the defendant was guilty of anything 
more than involuntary manslaughter. 
29 C. J. Homicide§ 137 at 1152 applies the above 
cited rule to cases where death is unintentionally 
caused in the correction or punishment of a child if 
the correction is immoderate but not manifestly 
dangerous to life, since under the circumstances, it 
is an assault and battery. See also 40 C.J.S. Homicide 
§ 58 at 920: 
It is involuntary manslaughter at common law and 
under statutes declaratory thereof where one un-
intentionally kills another in the commission of an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony or natural-
ly dangerous to human life. In determining whether 
a homicide was committed by a person while engag-
ed in the commission of a misdemeanor, while he 
must have had an intent to commit the act which 
constitutes the misdemeanor, it is not necessary 
that he shall have intended to violate the law. The 
degree of negligence, if any, is not important as 
an element of involuntary manslaughter based on 
an unlawful act. 
In the case of Regina v. Towers. 12 Cox's Cr. C. 
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530 (1874) where the defendant struck a 12 year old 
girl holding a small child in her arms, the child be-
came frightened, went into convulsions, lingered 
on for about six weeks and died. The court found 
that sufficient facts had been established to allow 
the case to go to the jury on the charge of involun-
tary manslaughter. Justice Denman said of the trial 
judge: 
. . . He should leave it to the jury to say whether 
the death of the child was caused by the unlawful 
act of the prisoner, or whether it was not so indirect 
as to be in the nature of accident. This case was 
different from other cases of manslaughter, for here 
the child was not a rational agent, and it was so 
connected with the girl that an injury to the girl 
became almost in itself an injury to the child. 
***It might be that in this case, unusual as it was, 
on the principal of common law, manslaughter had 
been committed by the prisoner. The prisoner com-
mitted an assault on the girl, which is an unlaw-
ful act, and if that act, in their judgment, caused 
the death of the child i.e., that the child would not 
have died but for that assault-they might find the 
prisoner guilty of manslaughter. He called their 
attention to some considerations that bore some 
analogy to this case. This was one of the new cases 
to which they had to apply old principles of law. 
It was a great advantage that it was to be settled by 
a jury, and not by a judge. If he were to say, as a 
conclusion of law that murder could not have been 
caused by such an act as this, he might have been 
laying down a dangerous precedent for the future; 
for, to commit a murder, a man might do the very 
same thing this man had done. . . . Then arose the 
question, which would be for them to decide, whe-
ther this death was directly the result of the pris-
oner's unlawful act-whether they thought that the 
prisoner might be held to be the actual cause of the 
child's death, or whether they were left in doubt 
upon that upon all the circumstances of the case. 
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After referring to the supposition that the convul-
sions were brought on owing to the child teethim· 
he said that, even though the teething might ha~~ 
had something to do with it, yet if the man's act 
brought on the convulsions or brought them to more 
dangerous extent, so that death would not have re-
sulted otherwise, then it would be manslaughter. 
If, therefore, the jury thought that the act of the 
prisoner in assaulting the girl was entirely uncon-
nected with it, that the death was not caused by 
it, but by a combination of circumstances, it would 
be accidential death and not manslaughter." 
The reasoning of Lord Denman was followed in 
Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566, 110 Pac. 1029, 1031 
(1910), where the defendant assaulted the deceased's 
son-in-law while wearing a pistol in her presence. 
Testimony of the physician, who attended her and 
had performed a post mortem, determined that de-
ceased had aneurism of the ascending aorta, which 
had ruptured causing her death. The physician 
further testified that excitement was one of three 
principle causes which would produce such a result. 
The Court held: 
It was not necessary in order to convict the prisoner 
that it should appear that his actual personal vio-
lence was the sole and immediate cause of the death 
of the deceased. If his violence so excited the terror 
of the deceased that she died from the fright, and 
she would not have died except for the assault, then 
the prisoner's act was in law the cause of her death. 
In the instant case the facts are much stronger. 
It is not disputed that appellant "whipped" deceas-
ed. The evidence supports the finding that appellant 
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exceeded the limits of parental authority to chastise. 
Respondent submits that the evidence was sufficient 
to allow the jury to find that appellant caused the 
death of deceased while committing an assault and 
battery upon his person. It is immaterial that the 
trauma itself was insufficient to cause death where 
death results from an unlawful act. 
Respondent submits that the purpose of the in-
voluntary manslaughter statute is to reduce homi-
cide resulting from unlawful acts. State v. Messely, 
126 Mont. 62, 244 P.2d 1054 (1952). 
In State v. Wheeler, 70 Idaho 455, 220 P.2d 887 
(1950) the court said that where one commits an act 
expressly forbidden by law and thereby causes the 
death of another, he may be convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter. Thus, where an act is condemn-
ed or made a crime by statute and the doing of such 
unawful act results in the death of another such 
result amounts to involuntary manslaughter. See 
State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1939). 
In State v. McNichols, 188 Kan. 582, 363 P.2d 467 
(1961) the court held that it is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for manslaughter in the fourth degree 
when a defendant charged with the offense caused 
the death of a human being while committing a 
crime amounting to a misdemeanor denounced by 
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statute which was for the purpose of protecting hu-
man life and safety, where the death would not 
have resulted except for the unlawful conduct. 
In State v. Frazier, 339 Mo. 966, 98 S.W.2d 707 
(1936) the court sustained a manslaughter conviction 
on the ground that since assault and battery are 
crimes it need not be established that death is the 1 
natural and probable result of the act; that it was 
factually caused thereby is sufficient. 
It will be seen that in none of the above cases 
was foreseeability of death an \ssue. In State v. 
Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1939) the language 
would seem to preclude foreseeability as an issue 
where the unintentional killing results from an un-
lawful assault and battery, which was not of a char-
acter likely to cause death. The same result appears 
to have reached in Wheeler, McNichols, and Frazier, 
cited above. 
Appellant cites Copeland v. State, 154 Tenn. 7, 
285 S. W. 565 (1926) for the proposition that death 
must be in the "natural probable consequence" of 
the unlawful act. Copeland is not a point. The circuit 
court found that Copeland was not violating any 
statute. It is conceeded that where an involuntary 
manslaughter is grounded solely on negligence, 
foreseeability may be an issue. But where it is 
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grounded on violation of a statute for the protec-
tion of human life, foreseeability is not controlling. 
In Copeland the court reversed and remanded the 
case: 
... for the failure of the trial court to charge that, 
if death did not result from Copeland's violation of 
statute, there could be no conviction, unless the 
boy's death was the reasonable and probable result 
of Copeland's negligent and reckless act ... 
It should be noted that Copeland v. State is an 
automobile homicide case and as will be noted be-
low such cases usually require a higher degree of 
culpability. 
There are Utah cases which hold that the "un-
lawful act" sufficient to satisfy the involuntary man-
slaughter statute must not only be an unlawful act 
not amounting to a felony, it must also be 
reckless conduct evincing a marked disregard for 
the safety of others. State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 
91 P.2d 457 (1939); State v. Barker, 113 Utah 514, 192 
P.2d 723 (1948); State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 
P.2d 290 (1943). These cases can be distinguished 
from the instant case in that they concern automo-
bile homicide. It seems that Utah law requires ,as a 
matter of public policy, a higher degree of culpabil-
ity for automobile homicide. 
Respondent submits that even were this higher 
degree of culpability required in this case, it is sat-
14 
isfied by the facts of this case. Instruction No. 12 
allowed the jury to find that appellant acted with-
out due care and circumspection. From the testi-
mony of Doctors Horne and Swift the jury would be 
justified in concluding that appellant not only ex-
ceeded the limits of parental authority to discipline 
a child, but that the beating was so severe as to 
amount to "conduct evincing a reckless and marked 
disregard for the safety of the deceased." 
Appellant alleges that the evidence in this case 
is not sufficient to allow the jury to do more than 
speculate as to the cause of the regurgitation. He 
points out that Dr. Switf testified that many things -
fear, anger, tantrums, as well as pain - could have 
caused regurgitation. 
Appellant ignores the expert testimony of Dr. 
Swift to the effect that it was his opinion that there 
was a connection between the external trauma and 
the aspiration. (R.83-84) Dr. Swift testified that the 
trauma brought about the regurgitation and that the 
child had to breathe before he had completely ex-
pelled the vomitus. Certainly this testimony is 
stronger than mere speculation. 
In State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208 at 213, 357 
P.2d at 187 (1960), this court held that: 
. . . a qualified expert is permitted to express an 
opinion even though other experts equally qualified 
may reach an opposite conclusion. In such case 
the weight to be given to such opinion is for the 
jury to determine. 
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It is submitted that the expert testimony of Dr. 
Swift was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the 
trauma caused the regurgitation and aspiration of 
vomitus and that such finding was based on more 
than mere speculation. 
Appellant relies on Witt v. Commonwealth, 304 
Ky. 818, 202 S.W.2d 634 (1947) to support his conten-
tion that where circumstantial evidence is relied on 
to establish the cause of death, a conviction for in-
voluntary manslaughter cannot be sustained. Res-
pondent submits that Witt, is not in point. In Witt 
the testimony of the doctor was that death could 
have been caused either by blows producing the 
wounds or by an over-indulgence in alcohol; he 
had no opinion nor could he determine which was 
the cause of death. In this case the jury could do no 
more than speculate. 
Appellant contends that the prosecution did not 
prove how the brusises on the deceased' s scrotum 
and penis were inflicted and that the admission into 
evidence of photographs showing these injuries was 
err and necessarily prejudicial and inflamatory. 
In the instant case respondent is charged with 
involuntary manslaughter resulting from child beat-
ing. It is submitted that pictures tending to show the 
extent of such a beating are admissable into evi-
dence notwithstanding whatever prejudicial effect 
they may have had. 
It is well established that it is within the discret-
16 
ion of the trial court to decide whether the probative 
value of a particular photograph outweighs its poss-
ible prejudicial effect. People v. Burbaker. 53 Cal.2d 
37. 346 P.2d 8 (1959). 
In Monge v. People. 158 Colo. 224, 406 P.2d 674 
(1965) the court held that photographs are not inad-
missible merely because they bring vividly to jurors 
the details of a shocking crime or that they could 
arouse passion or prejudice. 
In Cody v. State. Okl. Cr. 361 P.2d 307 (1961) the 
court held that photographs were admissible where 
they illustrate or clarify some issue of the case and 
are relevant and a faithful production of what they 
purport to reproduce. 
Respondent submits that the photographs in the 
instant case were relevant to the issue of the extent 
to which appellant beat the deceased. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in allowing these photo-
graphs into evidence. 
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in 
not distinguishing the two breakdowns of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-30-5(2) (1953), into its two component 
parts. The instruction complained of was submitted 
by appellant. 
It is submitted that appellant cannot write error 
into the record and then assign it is error on appeal. 
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Hightower v. State, 62 Ariz. 35, 158 P.2d 156 (1945); 
People v. Suggs, 142 C.A.2d 142, 297 P.2d 1039 (1956). 
In State v. Thompson. 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153 
(1946) this court held that giving erroneous instruc-
tions containing limitations similar to limitations 
contatined in defendant's instructions was not re-
versible error. 
In State v. Evans. 88 Ariz. 364, 356 P.2d 1106 
(1960) the court held that the reviewing court would 
not consider as grounds of error instruction request-
ed by the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence was sufficient to allow the jury 
to find appellant caused the death of the deceased 
while committing an unlawful act not amounting to 
a felony and that the trial court correctly denied 
appellant's motion for a directed verdict. 
The trial court correctly denied appellant's re-
quest for instructions as to foreseeability, as forsee-
abiilty was not in issue in this case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of 
the jury and the judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
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